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Indexing the lis pendens: 
Dyer v Martinez, 2007 
Roger Bernhardt 
 
Filing of lis pendens with county recorder does not impart constructive notice until 
indexed. 
Dyer v Martinez (2007) 147 CA4th 1240, 54 CR3d 907 
On September 9, 2004, Dyer sued the Rojases for specific performance and damages based on 
their alleged breach of a sales agreement for real property and, on the same day, deposited a lis 
pendens with the county recorder’s office for recording. Although the lis pendens reflected a 
September 9, 2004, recording date, it was not indexe  until September 14, 2004. On September 
10, 2004, escrow closed on the sale of the property to Martinez, who purchased it through loans 
provided by Argent, secured by trust deeds that listed Town & Country as trustee. 
Dyer filed an amended complaint for breach of contract, quiet title, and declaratory relief 
against Martinez, Argent, Town & Country (collectively, Defendants), and the Rojases, against 
whom she continued to seek specific performance. Defaults were entered against the Rojases. 
The trial court granted the remaining Defendants summary judgment on the ground that Dyer’s 
lis pendens failed to provide constructive notice of her claim against the property, and ordered 
the lis pendens expunged. Dyer petitioned for writ of mandate directing the superior court to 
vacate its expungement order. 
The court of appeal deemed the writ petition to be a notice of appeal from the judgment and 
affirmed. For more than a century, the law in California has been that a recorded document does 
not provide constructive notice to a bona fide purchaser of real property unless and until it can be 
located by a diligent title search, even if the litral wording of the relevant statute provided that 
the document imparted constructive notice from the date of filing with the recorder. To rely on 
the fiction of constructive notice and abrogate the requirement of actual notice, the party seeking 
recordation must ensure that all of the statutory requirements are met. Real property purchasers 
or mortgagees cannot be charged with constructive notice of documents they cannot locate; thus, 
a lis pendens that is not indexed does not give notice because no one can find the document. 
Nothing in the statute governing the recording of a lis pendens (CCP §405.24) indicates the 
legislature intended to abrogate the long-standing a d uniformly applied rule that purchasers do 
not receive constructive notice if a diligent title records search would not locate the documents 
providing that notice. The statute provides that constructive notice is given only when an 
instrument is recorded, not simply when an instrument is delivered to the recorder’s office. 
Given the history of constructive notice in California and the legislature’s comment that 
enactment of §405.24 was not intended to change existing law, the term “recording” in that 
statute means “recorded as prescribed by law.” Governm nt Code §27250 requires indexing of 
all recorded lis pendens. Thus, a lis pendens does n t provide constructive notice until it has been 
properly indexed. 
Although failing to impute constructive notice until a lis pendens is indexed may create 
uncertainty because the claimant has no control over wh n the recorder indexes the document, 
the uncertainty would be greater if a purchaser of real estate could not rely on a diligent search of 
public records to reveal a prior claimant’s interest. Placing the risk of loss due to a recorder’s 
delay in indexing on the claimant provides an incentiv  to diligently deposit the lis pendens for 
recordation. Placing the risk on the innocent purchaser or the purchaser’s title insurer does 
nothing to ensure the lis pendens is properly and timely recorded. 
The Editor’s Take: The plaintiff had to lose this case if the recording system was going to 
work; otherwise, none of the rest of us could ever rely on the indexes. But reaching that 
common-sense outcome is made difficult by the fact tha the literal language of our statutes 
seems to dictate a contrary result. Our lis pendens act provides that a recorded document 
gives constructive notice “[f]rom the time of recording” (CCP §405.24); “recording” is 
defined (in CC §1170) as meaning “deposited in the recorder’s office, with the proper 
officer,” without adding that the recorder’s office had better next make appropriate index 
entries showing its location in the official records so that searchers can thereafter find it. A 
document not properly indexed should not be deemed recorded, even though it may have 
been left with the recorder (and even though it may also have been placed in the official 
records), since no one will ever come across it thereafter. Thank heavens our courts have 
gone activist on this issue and displaced the literal and unworkable statutory definition in 
favor of a functional one that makes recording depend on findability. 
Not all courts are so bold. Last year, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court chose the literal 
version of the definition to conclude that a mortgage indexed under the wrong name 
nevertheless gave constructive notice to a subsequent party who had no actual knowledge of 
it because it had been properly delivered to the recorder’s office. First Citizens Nat’l Bank v 
Sherwood (Penn 2005) 879 A2d 178. It took a considerable amount of work by the 
Pennsylvania Bar Association to get that statute amnded to undo that result, by changing 
the statute to say that a document gives constructive notice only if it is “indexed properly.” 
The Pennsylvania court’s decision may seem silly, but that is considered to be the rule in a 
majority of states, according to Patton & Palomar on Land Titles §68 (3d ed 2003). (While I 
am suspect of that count, because many of the citations are pretty old, it is a fact that the 
Idaho Supreme Court reached the same result just three years ago—Miller v Simonson 
(Idaho 2004) 92 P3d 537—as did courts in Florida, Knsas, Louisiana, Vermont, and, more 
recently, West Virginia, where indexing is considered merely a ministerial act, according to 
Patton & Palomar.) 
More surprisingly, the drafters of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code consciously 
take that same position. Section 9–517 provides, “The failure of the filing office to index a 
record correctly does not affect the effectiveness of the filed record.” (Emphasis added.) 
(See also Com C §9517.) They say that mistakes don’t happen that often and they don’t 
want to overburden the filing office by having everybody coming back to double-check 
their filings, although that worry is rather hard for me to understand given the ability to 
computer search those files from one’s own office. 
Making life sensible for searchers, as this case does, comes at a price, however, and filers 
are the ones who will have to pay it. They will lose even if they have done everything 
right—i.e., left the right document at the right office with the right fee—but a governmental 
clerk then failed to properly index it thereafter. Under a definition that deems a document 
recorded only when it has been properly indexed, the filing party has to double-check that 
this critical last step was done right. 
In many cases, a search a few days later will show whether that was the case, but not 
always. Here, for instance, this plaintiff lost not because of a recorder’s error, but because 
of its delay, in a situation where time was critical. The plaintiff had to get her lis pendens on 
file fast in order to stop a closing that was to occur the next day. (The facts are not clear, but 
I assume that the timing of her filing was not just coincidental.) Ignoring the merits of her 
strategy and claim, her problem is one that I do not k w how to solve. 
Government Code §27320 says that the recorder shallrecord any instrument deposited 
there “without delay,” but I fear that means only copy it into the official records; the 
obligation to index it, in Govt C §27324, does not include the same time constraint. The 
Orange County Recorder’s Office indexing delay of 5 days violated no statute. (The only 
other statutory speed mandate I am aware of is in CC §2941(c), where a two-business-day 
deadline is imposed on the recorder, but that only requires the office to “stamp and record” 
a satisfaction of mortgage form it receives in the mail.)  
A frantic filer can perhaps nag the recorder to move more quickly, but I doubt that she 
could get any judge to issue a writ to that effect. Possession can also give notice, so there is 
the possibility of the plaintiff camping out on the property, but that idea seems subject to the 
legal difficulty that a purchaser’s obligation to lok at the property may not require going 
there every day to do so (and the practical difficulty that a vendor in possession may not 
take kindly to the plaintiff’s conduct). 
In this case, because the plaintiff did appear to kn w that escrow was to close the next 
day, she probably also knew, or could have found out, who the purchaser was or where the 
closing was to be. Since actual knowledge is supposed to be a good substitute for the 
constructive notice furnished by an indexed lis pendens (see Packard Bell Electronics Corp. 
v Theseus, Inc. (1966) 244 CA2d 355, 363, 53 CR 300), perhaps a letter to the right place 
might also work. (I would caution her to use Federal Express rather than the U.S. mails if 
she really wants it to get there in time.)—Roger Bernhardt 
 
